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The increase of fuel extraction costs as well as of temperature will make it likely that in the 
medium-term  future  technological  or  political  measures  against  global  warming  may  be 
implemented.  In  assessments  of  a  current  climate  policy  the  possibility  of  medium-term 
future developments like backstop technologies is largely neglected but can crucially affect its 
impact. Given such a future measure, a currently introduced carbon tax may more generally 
mitigate climate change than recent reflections along the line of the Green Paradox would 
suggest. Notably, the weak and the strong version of the Green Paradox, related to current 
and longer-term emissions, may not materialize. Moreover, the tax may allow the demanding 
countries to extract part of the resource rent, further increasing its desirability. 
Keywords 
Climate change policy, greenhouse gas tax, carbon tax, Green Paradox, anticipation effects, 
exhaustible resources, fossil fuels market, backstop technology, uncertainty, resource rent. 
JEL Classification 
Q54, Q31, Q38, Q41, Q42. 1 Introduction
In his seminal contribution, Pearce (1991) discussed conveniences of a carbon tax as an
e￿cient policy instrument to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. He solely considered the
demand side, implicitly assuming a ￿xed, exogenous energy supply function.
Today a large fraction of climate economics research still exhibits the same limitation,
reducing the supply side of the energy market to a static process. However, at least since
the contribution of Sinn (2008), there exists growing awareness that supply side e￿ects
can be crucial for the assessment of carbon emission reduction strategies. Along the claim
which Sinn entitled ‘Green Paradox’, a realistic carbon tax introduced at a low initial level
but rapidly increasing over time might be counterproductive for the climate, by primarily
accelerating exploitation of the limited resources rather than delaying or reducing their
combustion. This is the conclusion he derives from a model in which owners of limited
stocks of fossil fuels optimise their sales over time. They anticipate in early periods that
the tax will in future be higher, inducing them to sell more of their fuels today rather than
on the highly taxed future markets. While controversial, Sinn’s analysis has impressively
demonstrated the importance of supply side e￿ects for the assessment of greenhouse gas
policies.
There exists a growing literature that tries to assess the possibility for the mentioned
counterproductive e￿ects of climate protection policies to occur in speci￿c situations. Fo-
cusing on alternative technologies rather than on a carbon tax, Gerlagh (2011) examines
the impact of suppliers’ anticipation on the climate bene￿ts from cheaper future backstop
technologies. A similar direction is taken by Van der Ploeg and Withagen (2010). While
the latter also show that in some cases a speci￿c, not rapidly increasing tax could be
bene￿cial for the climate, they do not discuss e￿ects of other, non-optimal taxes. Polborn
(2011) concludes that intensifying research on carbon capture and storage has the advan-
tage of reverting the negative anticipation e￿ects that research on backstop technologies
would have in terms of near-term carbon emissions.
The analyses by Sinn and subsequent contributors assumed a world in which the debated
policy would be the only potential relevant climate measure, valid from today on through-
out the entire future. But abstaining from a carbon tax today will not imply that neither
a carbon tax, nor any alternative climate relevant development may materialize in the
future. Rather, without substantial measures today, the unlimited growth of the climate
threat may increase the necessity of future measures to be taken, implying even more
stringent future measures than if the carbon tax would have been introduced today. This
point is likely to be relevant for the desirability of a current carbon tax as the resource
owners may not only anticipate a rapidly increasing tax but also other potential future
measures.
2In a recent contribution, Hoel (2010) has taken some account for this. He has been the
￿rst to explicitly model the fact that to purposely avoid the introduction of a current tax
in￿uences only the probability to have a certain tax in the medium or long-term future,
rather than implying that the current abstention could necessarily prevent any potential
future tax. He considered a stylized two-period model with the carbon tax in the second
period being endogenous, and found that the impossibility of long-term commitments of
current politics increases the desirability of the introduction of a carbon tax today.
Finally, Van der Ploeg and Withagen (2011) discuss the e￿ect of dirty and clean backstops
on optimal carbon taxation. However, they focus on backstops that are already available
today and, more importantly, consider only the choice of optimized or prohibitive tax
paths, ignoring the possibility of the arbitrarily increasing taxes that are inherently part
of the argumentation of the Green Paradox.
In this paper, we model the impact of an ￿ eventually rapidly increasing ￿ carbon tax on
global medium and long-term emissions, taking future climate measures into account: we
assess the impact of current carbon taxes given the fact that even if a tax is currently
avoided, other climate measures, such as backstop technologies, global fuel demand cartels
￿ la Kyoto, carbon capture and storage systems, or, last but not least, alternative carbon
taxes, may be introduced at some point in the future. In order to keep the model tractable,
we assume these future measures to be introduced independently of the current tax,
although in many cases taking into account the endogeneity of such measures could even
strengthen our ￿ndings.
The analysis is based on a dynamic multi-period model of the behaviour of forward looking
resource owners. They seek to maximize their present discounted revenues by optimally
rationing the sales of their resources over time. In order to derive rather general results, we
leave the exact nature of the modelled market as open as possible. We do neither assume
a speci￿c functional form for the extraction cost curve nor use speci￿c assumptions about
the tax path or the time-varying demand function. Finally, we consider both cases, where
the suppliers act monopolistically or competitively. In addition, we investigate the case
where a carbon tax is only introduced regionally, i.e. in some part(s) of the world.
In the presence of an anticipated future regime change such as the introduction of a
backstop technology, any presently implemented positive tax path bridging the time until
the future measure becomes e￿ective unambiguously reduces cumulative emissions not
only in the long, but already in the medium-term, suggesting that the strong version
of the Green Paradox may not hold. 1 This generally holds for a backstop technology
becoming worldwide e￿ective at a speci￿c future time. At least for limited tax levels, the
1Following Gerlagh (2011) we use the notions of weak and strong versions of the Green Paradox to
di￿erentiate between the increase of current emissions (weak) resp. of net present value of cumulative
emissions (strong) due to the anticipation of cheaper clean energy.
3results remain valid in the case of regional taxes. The exact type of the future scheme
does not a￿ect our ￿ndings. According to recent estimates the warming e￿ect of emissions
in the current century will remain almost unchanged over at least the next 1’000 years
(Solomon et al., 2009). This suggests that, as far as we restrict the attention to medium-
term emissions, primarily the cumulative emissions matter and the exact path of the
emissions across the decades is only of limited additional importance. Thus, reducing
medium-term emissions, the tax is very likely favourable for the climate.
Giving up the assumption that an alternative measure is implemented at a ￿xed point
of time, we further consider a case where the time of the introduction of the backstop is
stochastic. Even under these conditions, the weak version of the Green Paradoxes’ claim,
i.e. that taxes increasing at a rate faster than the real interest rate lead to increased
current emissions, does not necessarily hold; taxes increasing at rates higher than the real
interest rate can not only reduce cumulative emissions for some future period, but reduce
current and near term emissions as well.
This analysis has important implications for climate policy assessment in general. There
exist numerous assessments of di￿erent climate policy measures, but these studies typically
compare scenarios with the measure in question to a business as usual scenario containing
no alternative climate policy measures. There is, however, no reason to believe that the
decision about a particular climate policy will be decisive for every other potential climate
measure as well. Taking the possibility of alternative climate measures into account might
often be necessary to prevent strongly biased results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model for
the resource owners’ intertemporal decision problem. In Section 3, we show how the
anticipation of a backstop implemented in the medium-term future a￿ects the resource
suppliers’ behavior in the business as usual scenario without any present tax. We explain
that the anticipation of the future regime change induces a situation that is comparable
to a future high tax, implying even according to the anticipation e￿ects pointed out by
Sinn (2008) that it becomes especially urgent to introduce a present tax.
Section 4 shows that a presently introduced tax bridging the time up to the introduction
of the backstop will unambiguously reduce cumulative medium-term emissions. Section
5 explains how the analytical derivation in the previous section extends to the case of
alternative future schemes. In Section 6, we discuss possible extensions of the model and
show the robustness of our analysis to a tax that may be applied only regionally. Also, in
this section, we show that a stochastic time of introduction of the backstop implies that
taxes can unambiguously reduce short- and medium-term emissions even if they increase
faster than the maximal rate which, according to the proposition of the Green Paradox,
is compatible with a reduction of carbon emissions. We also shortly discuss the possible
endogeneity of the future scheme switch.
4Section 7 provides a short discussion of the importance of the future regime switch to
our results, as well of how the tax can lead to a shift of part of the resource rent to the
consumer countries. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
Lumping the di￿erent categories of fossil fuels into one considered resource, we assume a
world where consumers’ instantaneous demand rate rt, which equals the extraction rate,
is a continuous, strictly decreasing, and potentially time-varying function of its price,
pt. Thus, we have the demand curve, rt(pt), as well as its inverse, pt(rt), as two strictly
decreasing functions, r0
t() < 0, p0
t() < 0, where the strict inequalities may only not apply
if the values of r or p reach their respective upper or lower boundaries, should these exist.
Instantaneous extraction rates integrate to cumulative extractions, At, which are normal-
ized to zero at the starting time, A0  0, At =
 t
0 rsds. Extraction costs, c, are assumed
to be strictly increasing in the cumulative extractions: c0(A) > 0. This implies that the
most easily extractable resources are extracted ￿rst - a standard assumption which has
been shown to be a necessary condition for the potential optimality of an extraction path
(Her￿ndahl, 1967).2
We model the resource owners’ problem of maximizing their present value of expected
total net revenues, applying a positive discount rate .
Given a tax path t, the revenue ￿ow for a speci￿c seller i at time t is rt;i  (pt   ct   t),







 trt;i  (pt(rt)   c(At)   t)dt (1)
s.t.
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In the competitive (comp) case, suppliers’ individual rates are so small that each considers
the market price as given independently of his own supply, while the monopolistic (mono)
supplier will take the e￿ect of his extraction rate onto prices into account, since the total
rate equals his own supply rate, rt  rt;i. De￿ning Pt as the considered rate of change of
2For positive real interest rates it is actually straightforward to see that this must hold.
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Taking this into account in the current-value Hamiltonian,
H = rt  (pt(rt)   c(At)   t)   trt; (2)
we arrive at the following two ￿rst order conditions:
@H
@rt
= 0 : Pt(rt) = c(At) + t + t (3)
_ t = t +
@H
@At
: _ t = t   _ ct; (4)
where we de￿ned ct  c(At), and where t is the shadow value at time t for a marginal unit
of resource stock, after the cumulative extraction of At previous units. This multiplier t
is a non-negative value, as with a larger resource stock, the producer’s future extraction
costs will be reduced and therefore the future achievable pro￿t potentially higher and
never lower.
The backward resp. forward looking explicit solution for the multiplier in Eq. (4) become,















The primary assumptions on which we will base our analysis of the supply behavior
implicitly de￿ned with the maximization problem are the following:
￿ Property 1: p(0) > c(0), i.e. in the absence of a tax there will be a strictly positive
extraction rate at least at the starting time.
￿ Property 2: p(0) < 1, i.e. the choke-price is ￿nite. This is an intuitive assumption
notably as surrogates such as renewable wood or plant oils lend themselves as natural
substitutes.
￿ Property 3: c(A) < p(0) ) 0 < c0(A) < 1, i.e. as long as some resources are
pro￿tably extractable, the rate of increase of the extraction costs is strictly positive
and ￿nite.
6￿ Property 4: limr!1 p(r) = 0, i.e. when the supply rate tends to in￿nity, the demand
price becomes zero.
￿ Property 5: Single-crossing in the ￿rst order conditions for the monopolistic supplier:
the marginal revenue of a monopolist’s resource sales at a speci￿c period is falling in
the current rate of extraction, i.e.
@[p(r)+p0(r)r]
@r < 0 holds in the case for the globally
homogenous market, and
@[p(r;)+p0(r;)r]
@r < 0 in the case of the regional tax. 3
3 Future Regime Change in the BAU
In our analysis, the business as usual scenario (BAU) simply refers to the case in which
no present tax is introduced. However, we generally assume it to contain a relevant future
regime switch. As this is a major di￿erence to previous studies, this section compares
this BAU to the case where no future regime change would take place.
Ruling out taxes, the suppliers’ maximization problem can be represented by the Hamilto-
nian formulation from Eqs. (2) through (4), by simply assuming t to be zero everywhere.
Introducing a backstop at time T prevents future sales and thus implies that the value of
the remaining resources at that time are zero. In this case, we can use t = T and T = 0







This shows that t is positive and approaches zero for t ! T.
If, on the other hand, no backstop is introduced, we know that limt!1 te-t = 0. Using







Thus, for any time t prior to the extraction of the last unit, the multiplier t will take
on a strictly positive value in the BAU variant without backstop. This will notably be
the case for the time of the implementation of the backstop in the other BAU scenario,
i.e. at T: de￿ning the backstop-scenario as a case where the backstop is relevant, implies
that it would be introduced at a time before the resource extraction would otherwise have









3This assumption seems largely unproblematic; an extended note on it is provided in Part A of the
Annex.
7It is obvious that the introduction of the backstop at time T a￿ects the resource owners’
optimization problem exactly in the same manner as a tax introduced at T would if the
tax rate were to be high enough for preventing any oil sales from time T onwards. This
leads already to the primary mechanism by which we will ￿nd that in expectation of al-
ternative future schemes it is rather urgent than counterproductive to introduce stringent
present carbon dioxide taxes: given the future schemes, the suppliers anticipate a future
tax-resembling measure - if no tax is introduced today, the situation for the suppliers
will correspond to one with a high future tax but with none today, which corresponds
exactly to the case in which the Green Paradox would - in this case righteously - predict
counterproductive e￿ects. A tax introduction today is thus even more urgent the more
anticipation e￿ects drive the resource owners.
As is emphasized in Proposition 1 and proven in Part B of the Annex, Eq. (6) ultimately
implies that the anticipated introduction of the backstop in the BAU scenario increases
the pre-T emissions.
Proposition 1. An anticipated increase (decrease) of the marginal value of the unex-
ploited resources at a speci￿ed future time will lead to a decrease (increase) in cumulative
extraction during the period up to that future time.
4 Introducing a Tax before the Backstop
Here we consider the case for a present tax when a backstop technology is introduced in
the medium-term future at time T. The Hamiltonian formulation with the corresponding
￿rst order conditions for the dynamic problem is given in Eqs. (2) through (4) in Section
2.
Recall that the multiplier becomes zero at the time of the introduction of the backstop,
T = 0. This strong assumption, which has been used in earlier literature as well (see e.g.
Dasgupta and Heal 1974), may not necessarily have to be as far away from reality as it
may seem at ￿rst sight: given that a backstop will substitute the fossil fuels in all major
energy related applications, the residual demand for them, dedicated to, e.g., chemical
applications, will only amount to a limited fraction of prior consumption, drastically
reducing the expected achievable resource rent. Note that the smaller demand would
limit the scope for monopolies as even owners of small stocks could become relevant
competitors. We will consider the case for a residual value T for the post-T period that
is non-zero and can vary with the amount of resources left at time T, in the next section.
As the tax generally reduces the possible net revenues from resource sales, it seems intu-
itive that positive tax rates will lead to reduced cumulative extractions.
8Proposition 2. If at a speci￿c time T > 0 an alternative climate measure that ￿xes the
marginal value T(AT) = T = const is introduced, any scheme of positive carbon taxes
up to time T leads to a reduction of cumulative emissions up to time T.
Proposition 2 is proven in Part D of the Annex.
If a regime change such as the introduction of a backstop technology is anticipated, a
carbon tax thus yields a decrease of total consumption, independently of the form of the
tax path or of the demand and production cost structure. According to our argumentation
above, reducing cumulative medium-term emissions is of primordial importance compared
to the exact path of the emissions, as long as relatively limited time-spans are considered.
Thus under the assumption of a future backstop quite any path of nonnegative tax rates
is bene￿cial for the climate.
5 Extension to Alternative Future Schemes
In Proposition 2 we have shown that any (continuous) path of positive tax rates reduces
cumulative resource use during the period from the introduction of the tax until its re-
placement by a di￿erent climate change mitigation measure, given that the value of the
marginal remaining resource unit for post-T sales is independent of the size of the stock of
remaining resources, i.e. T(AT) = const. This condition may not necessarily be given in
reality: rather, the marginal value of additional reserves, T, depends on the cumulative
exploitations at time T for example if the post-T scheme is a demand cartel or an ex-
tremely high tax - only with a (perfect) backstop completely substituting the fossils would
T not vary with the residual resource stock. This section shows that the argument for
the tax to be reducing cumulative extractions extends to the case of a ￿exible multiplier,
T = T(AT).
If the post-T regime does not prohibit all lucrative sales of the resource, an increase of
the remaining stock of resources can a￿ect T in either direction: satiation and the higher
discounting of future sales tend to decrease the shadow value of additional resources on
one hand, but the lower extraction costs for the additional unextracted resources can
also increase the additional units’ value. Without further assumptions about the exact
nature of the post-T resource market framework or about extraction costs or the demand
function it cannot a priori be known which e￿ect dominates. Still, using Proposition 1,
we show that the economics of the problem implies that one can rule out one possible
case for the relationship between T and AT in the region of the optimally chosen amount
of cumulative extractions, A
T. Then, an illustration why the derived restriction on the
9relationship between T and AT implies that Proposition 2 extends to cases with a ￿exible
￿nal multiplier T(AT) follows.
First, some clari￿cations about the relationships between the marginal value and the
amount of cumulative exploitations at the time of the introduction of the new regime, T
and AT. The function T(AT) indicates the value of a marginal additional unexploited
unit of resource at time T available for the post-T period, de￿ned as the additional
(expected) pro￿t the resource owner can make in the post- T future if he has a marginally
increased stock of remaining exploitable resources at time T. Conversely, function AT(T)
designates the cumulative amount of pre-T sales the resource owner chooses for a given
￿nal marginal multiplier T. It therefore corresponds to the amount of pre- T sales for
which the sale of an additional marginal unit in the pre- T period would yield exactly
T additional corresponding units of pre-T pro￿ts (ignoring the in￿uence on the post-T
situation). Optimizing his overall pro￿ts, the resource owner will choose an amount A
T
of pre-T sales for which the marginal additional pre-T pro￿t for another sold marginal
unit in the pre-T period just equates the marginal foregone pro￿t from post- T sales due
to the increase of the pre-T exploitations. With other words, if A
T denotes the choosen
(optimal) amount of pre-T sales, and 











T () is the inverse function of AT(T).
For the following be 
pre
T (AT)  Ainv
T (AT), whose simple interpretation is the marginal
pre-T pro￿t from additional pre-T sales given AT units sold until T. For clarity then, call

post
T (AT)  T(AT).
Recall from Proposition 1 that AT(T) is decreasing in T. Thus, for the optimal amount














must hold, as otherwise it would be lucrative for the resource owner to increase A
T: the
change in overall discounted pro￿ts,  = pre + post can be approximated as
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for small deviations from A
T. Clearly, if Eq. (7) does not hold, Eq. (8) would imply
10pro￿ts that increase for any small value of ", i.e. A
T would not be a pro￿t-maximizing
choice. Graphically, this is illustrated in Fig. 1, where the pluses indicate regions in which
it would be optimal for the resource owner to increase pre- T sales, and minuses where it






















Figure 1: Possible equilibrium situations with ￿exible T(AT)
As a second point, recall, from Proposition 2, that the tax unambiguously reduces pre- T
sales for any given ￿xed T. As the function AT(T) remains the same here as when

post
T (AT) was constant, we thus know that in a diagram with AT on the horizontal axis,











Figure 2: Tax reduces pre-T emissions AT for constant T
11Considering the case where 
post0
T (A
T) > 0, it is straightforward to see that this implies
that the tax reduces the optimal amount of pre- T sales A
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T) > 0, 
pre0
T (AT) < 0 and Atax
T (T) < Ano tax
T (T), we have A
T;tax < A
T;no.
By a similar argument and using Eq. (7) it becomes clear that even if 
post0
T (AT) < 0,
A
T;tax < A
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Figure 4: Tax reduces pre-T emissions AT for ￿exible T(AT) when 0
T(AT) < 0
Therefore the proposition from the previous section extends to the case of a ￿exible ￿nal
multiplier, 
T = T(A
T), which we summarize in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. If at a speci￿c future time T an alternative climate measure is introduced
that ￿xes the marginal value to a continuous di￿erentiable function of the cumulative
extractions up to T, T = T(AT), any scheme of positive CO 2 taxes up to time T leads
to a reduction of cumulative emissions up to time T.
126 Further Extensions
6.1 A Regional Tax
So far, experiences with climate protection discussions suggest that, should in the close
future some international carbon tax be introduced, not all countries may be willing to
participate in such a treaty. We therefore examine the e￿ect of a bridging tax which
remains limited to a part of the world. Analytically, this implies that the world, respec-
tively its demand for fossil fuels, is split in two regions: Region 1 which imposes a tax
on its carbon emissions, and Region 2 which will not take any comparative regulatory
action in the close future. In our model for this divided world we assume in a ￿rst step
that the ratio by which the worldwide demand is split is - for a price that is the same in
both regions - ￿xed and constant over time. We explain at the end of the modeling part
why the conclusions derived extend to the case where the fractions of the two regions of
the world are changing over time. This last point may be of relevance as the parts of the
world that have been revealed as the leaders resp. the laggards in the current political
climate debate do not exhibit only distinguished climate intensities but also di￿erent rates
of growth of their respective demand.
Demand structure A demand for fossil fuels split into two ￿xed regions implies that
the demand resulting for a speci￿c price in one region can be expressed as a multiple of
the corresponding demand in the other region. Accordingly, we introduce the variable x
as the following ratio:
r2(p) = x  r1(p);
i.e. x indicates which multiple of the demand in Region 1, r1, corresponds to demand in
Region 2, r2.
The worldwide demand is the sum of both regions’ demands,
r = r1 + r2:
When a tax is levied in Region 1, the consumption price for the resource, p1, will be
the sum of the consumption price of Region 2, p2, and the tax level, . The price p2
corresponds to the sales price for the resource owner, pR:
p1 = p2 +  = pR + 
p2 = pR
The demands of the two regions, r1(p1) and r2(p2) can thus be expressed as r1(p1) =
r1(pR + ) and r2(p2) = r2(pR). Thus, as shown in Fig. 5, the total demand for a given
13sales price and tax rate is

















Figure 5: Regional demand with tax in Region 1
E￿ect of the tax on the demand The demand curves of both regions are assumed
to be continuous and strictly decreasing. Eq. (9) implies thus that the current worldwide
demand decreases as well in the current sales price pR as in the current tax rate .
Therewith the inverse demand curve, here the sales price which yields a speci￿c demand,
pR(r;), is strictly decreasing in r.




= c(At) + t: (10)
While it eventually seems intuitive, without any further analytical inspection it seems not
necessarily clear whether the LHS of the supplier’s adapted FOC, Eq. (10), decreases
unambiguously in t in the case of the regional tax. It is therefore proven and stated as a
general result in Lemma 1 (the lemma is stated below Proposition 4 and its proof given
in Part E of the Annex), at least for limited tax levels.
Thus, according to Lemma 1, a regional tax levied on Region 1’s consumption at time t
reduces worldwide consumption at the same time t for a given multiplier t and extraction
costs ct. Given this result, it is straightforward to see that the proof for Proposition 2
extends to the case of the regional tax - Lemma 1 ensures that Eq. (A.12) holds in the
proof.
14Thus, also a regional tax leads to a reduction in cumulative emissions up to time T, which
is emphasized as Proposition 4. Note that, while we are not aware of any particular reasons
for which the statement should not extend to larger taxes as well, the proven validity of
our analytical derivations for Lemma 1 and thus Proposition 4 is restricted to certain
smoothness conditions for the tax as well to tax rates that are not too large.
The analysis remains valid in the case where the demand-ratio between the regions, x,
varies over time: Lemma 1 is not a￿ected at all, and the proof of Proposition 2 allows for
time-varying pR(r;).
We thus emphasize the following result:
Proposition 4. If an alternative climate measure is introduced at a speci￿c future time
T, any scheme with positive carbon taxes covering a (eventually non-constant) fraction of
the world’s demand up to time T leads to a reduction of cumulative worldwide emissions
up to T, at least for limited tax rates.





= c(At) + t
exists, then a current regional tax at time t levied on Region 1’s consumption reduces
current worldwide consumption for a given multiplier t and extraction costs ct, at least
for not too large tax rates.
The proof of Lemma 1 is provided in Part E of the Annex.
6.2 Stochastic Introduction of the Future Scheme
It cannot be predicted with certainty which future development in terms of climate change
mitigation may once prevent all carbon stored in fossil fuels to be released into the at-
mosphere. It would be even more unrealistic to pretend knowing when exactly such a
breakthrough will occur. Also, the change may come gradually over several years rather
than at one speci￿c point in time. What’s more, the uncertainty about the time of the
future regime change may even be large. Finally, it could also be the case that no real
regime change will happen at all. To account for these uncertainties, a stochastic model
has to be considered, eventually considerably complicating the analysis.
An analytical investigation of the stochastic case may be possible to a certain extent,
especially with a backstop, at the introduction of which the resources left underground
at time T will loose all their value. In such a case, the stochastic end time can readily
15be accounted for by augmenting the discounting rate  by an appropriate term  t and
otherwise using the deterministic model, as has been shown by Dasgupta and Heal (1974).
For simplicity, we here consider the case where the probability of the introduction of
a backstop, conditional on no prior occurrence (further called periodic probability), is
constant. The additional discounting factor,  , which equals this periodic probability,
inherits this constancy, i.e.  t =  . This implies that the analytical structure of the model
does not di￿er from the deterministic case at all. Note that the underlying (unconditional)
probability density for the introduction of the backstop at date t is then f(t) =  e- t.
The additional discount factor due to the possible introduction of the backstop alters the
conclusion about the taxes’ impact on the emissions. While in the case where no backstop
was considered the Green Paradox would hold up to a certain extent, implying that a tax
rising more rapidly than with the real interest rate would lead to larger current emissions,
this ￿nding is not valid anymore in the case of the possible backstop: in this case, taxes
that exponentially rise at any rate lower than +  imply reductions of current emissions
and lower cumulative emissions at any future time period. We emphasize this claim with
Proposition 5 - the analytical proof is given in Part F of the Annex.
Proposition 5. Any positive tax exhibiting a rate of increase, , that ￿gures between 0
and the sum of the real interest rate, , and the periodic probability of the introduction of a
backstop technology,  , leads to a reduction of the expectancy of the cumulative emissions
and notably does for no period yield increased potential cumulative emissions.
6.3 Endogenous Future Regime Change
The introduction of a carbon tax changes on one hand the consumption prices for con-
ventional energy and therewith incentives for the development of alternative technologies.
On the other hand, it directly a￿ects the carbon emissions and the climate and thus the
political pressure to work on additional measures. It is clear that a present tax may
therefore in￿uence the likelihood resp. the timing of the implementation of future mea-
sures. Assuming the latter to be perfectly exogenous is thus a simpli￿cation of reality
and it seems important to address the possible endogeneity of the future climate regime.
But this is beyond the scope of the present work. It can, however, be foreseen that
the direction of the e￿ect on the expected results is ambiguous: lower political pressure
due to eventually tax induced emissions reductions could lower the probability of early
measures. But technological development boosted by the eventually higher carbon prices
could imply earlier development of substitute technologies.
167 Discussion
Arguments questioning the relevance of the Green Paradox have already been raised prior
to this paper. Yet, the possibility of an exogenous future regime switch has been ne-
glected so far in the literature on that topic. Taking this additional element into account
in the modeling of the e￿ects of a carbon tax renders the predictions more accurate and
shows that a carbon tax may be more desirable than previous studies have suggested
overall. This is important notably as some other points in favor of the tax raised in liter-
ature do not necessarily invalidate all aspects of the Green Paradox. Hoel (2010) argues
that any positive tax rate would reduce overall, i.e. long-term, emissions anyway, which
can intuitively be understood, given smoothly increasing extraction costs together with a
demand-price limited by a ￿nite choke-price: while without any tax the last unit of fuel
exploited would be the one for which extraction costs correspond to the choke-price, this
price would be reduced by any positive tax. Due to the increasing extraction cost curve
this would imply that total extractions would decrease as well. Due to two reasons this
insight may not in every case be considered as a decisive argument in favor of a carbon tax:
depending on the form of the demand function and the extraction costs curve de￿ning the
’available’ resource quantities, if no future regime switch were available, the time when
the last unit of the resource would be exploited may theoretically lie far enough in the
future that the timing of the emissions could not anymore be considered as of subordinate
importance compared to the absolute emissions. Even more importantly, if alternative
technologies are not developed well enough, the choke-price of the demand may be large
enough for the extraction cost curve to be rather steep at the corresponding point already:
given that the total amount of the physically existent fossil reserves is a limited quantity,
of which on one hand an important fraction is exploitable at rather low costs but on the
other hand the last drops somewhere deep in the ground would be exploitable only at
very high costs, it may seem plausible that the cost curve in the region of the choke-price
may be rather steep, implying that the change in the overall exploited quantity may vary
only to a small extent as a reaction to some limited tax.
Beyond the above analysis, there is an additional reason why the anticipation e￿ects could
increase the desirability of a carbon tax rather than reduce it. Without the external cli-
matic e￿ects of the combustion of carbon containing fuels, one may generally depart from
the assumption that an eventual carbon tax could be associated with negative economic
e￿ects on the taxed region. This negative e￿ect on the economy may increase with the
level of the tax, and only the negative climatic externalities may justify an eventual car-
bon tax: for a ￿xed net fuel price and in a ￿rst approximation the optimal compromise
between climate protection and economic activity should be achieved by a tax level that
corresponds to the level of the marginal climate costs of an emitted unit of carbon. In this
17case, the demand for fuels should be reduced to the point from which on an additional
reduction would yield economic costs that exceed the additional bene￿t from increased
climate protection4. Now, the analysis of the pro￿t maximizing behavior of the resource
owners shows that they reduce the net price they demand for their goods if a climate tax
is introduced. Therewith, the previously described ‘optimal’ climate tax would reduce
the consumption by less than the climate policy maker may have expected, should he
have neglected this behavioral adaptation: the gross price does not increase by the full
amount of the tax rate, but only by part of it. In this sense one could at ￿rst sight be
tempted to consider the tax as ine￿cient. The reduction of the demanded net sales price
from the side of the resource owners could, however, also be utilized to ￿x the tax rate
so much above the ‘optimal’5 tax rate until the gross price exceeds the net price from the
no-tax scenario by the value of the ‘optimal’ tax rate. 6 In this case the originally located
demand reduction and the originally mentioned economic costs result: despite the higher
than originally described tax rate, the costs for the economy increase only by the originally
targeted value. At the same time, however, the taxing region generates higher extra tax
revenues, which corresponds to a transfer of parts of the resource rent from the resource
owners to the consumer countries. The tax induced behavioral adaptation of the resource
owners can thus be used to the advantage of the fuel importing countries and increases
the economic attractivity of such a tax. In this sense the pro￿t-expectation-reductions
related to the anticipatory e￿ects of the resource owners, and the associated attenuation
of the impact of the tax on the sales price and the demand, should not be considered as
an e￿ciency problem of the tax. Rather, they should be understood as a possible means
to reduce, in an e￿cient manner, at the same time the cumulative demand as well as the
import costs of the oil.
8 Conclusions
The claim that carbon taxes with rapidly increasing tax rates would exacerbate the cli-
mate problem rather than alleviating it, cannot be sustained as generally as it has been
suggested with the Green Paradox.
This paper indicates two primary reservations against the claims brought forward with
4It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the numerous practical problems of the introduction
of such a tax - while very crucial for any project of a carbon tax in general, they seem to be of minor
importance to our speci￿c argumentation.
5Optimal in the sense of the level that would be desirable if no supply-side adaptation would be made.
6In this case, the result could indeed be improved even further when the tax rate is not exactly ￿xed
in this way. Beyond the scope of this article, a discussion of the optimal tax accounting for the strategic
consumer-owner interaction on the resource market can be found in Liski and Tahvonen (2004) who
examine a ￿rst best climate taxation in general, and Dullieux et al. (2010) who examine the optimal tax
given a 2￿ C warming equivalent emission constraint. Both studies ￿nd that under certain conditions the
optimal tax may contain an import tari￿ component, i.e. be larger than the pure Pigou tax.
18the Green Paradox, both based on the fact that even if we were to abstain from intro-
ducing a carbon tax today, other future climate related developments may in￿uence the
resource market some time in the future and therewith the carbon emission path. Such
possible developments do not only encompass technological innovations driven by rising
fossil fuel extraction costs, but also political movements alimented by ever rising emissions
and temperature, severely a￿ecting many densely populated regions all over the world.
The potential measures include, among others, backstop technologies, demand cartels,
carbon capture and storage systems or prohibitively high future carbon taxes. Both our
reservations suggest that given the possibility of such future measures, a currently intro-
duced carbon tax may be more favorable for the evolution of our climate than predicted
according to the Green Paradox:
First, if some of the mentioned future climate regime switches were to materialize at the
speci￿ed time in the medium-term, then the cumulative emissions may be more relevant
than the detailed evolution of the emission path, and the analytical analysis of the optimal
behavior of the resource owners suggests that these cumulative emissions up to the time of
the regime switch may be reduced for any tax path with positive tax rates, independently
of the rate of increase of the tax level.
Second, if a future regime switch such as the introduction of a backstop technology is
stochastic, our model suggests that even the weak version of the Green Paradox does not
hold anymore: not only cumulative emissions in future periods, but also current emissions
can be reduced by carbon taxes whose levels increase more rapidly than at the real interest
rate. More precisely this is the case for any tax whose rate of increase is below the sum
of the real interest rate plus the perceived conditional probability of the introduction of
the backstop.
In addition to the impact of the taxes on the climate, the anticipation e￿ects can even
be bene￿cial for the consumer countries in the sense that the tax allows these countries
to extract part of the suppliers’ resource rent, which may increase the carbon tax related
welfare gains for the demand countries.
Some caveats regarding the ￿ndings presented in the paper are in order. First, in the
framework of the stochastic regime switch, our result gives only a clear indication for
a tax whose maximal rate of increase is still limited, even, if due to the possibility of
the backstop this limit may be substantially higher than the one originally suggested
by the Green Paradox. It is clear, however, that, along the line of our argumentation
brought forward in the deterministic case, the examination of the stochastic case should
not stop here: even a tax that may rise faster than our elevated threshold rate of increase
identi￿ed in the stochastic analysis, may overall be bene￿cial: it may slightly rise the
initial periods’ emissions, but lead to substantial emission reductions later on. In the case
where the probability distribution for the occurrence of the regime switch may indicate
19that the latter is likely to occur in the medium-term, our argumentation for the primary
relevance of the cumulative emissions should be considered as well: if the tax leads to
substantial cuts of future emissions, these reductions may more than compensate for the
smaller increases in earlier emissions.
Second, we ignored the potential endogeneity of the future climate scheme change. This is
a severe limitation, as it is clear that the eventual carbon tax a￿ects virtually all variables
in￿uencing the potential future regime switch, e.g. the temperature path, the consumer
price, the general economic development, or the technical progress with alternative ener-
gies.
Finally, we explained that especially for the here relevant medium-term future the cu-
mulative emissions may prime in importance over the detailed emission path. This is
only a simpli￿ed view. Ideally, one would more properly weight increases of current emis-
sions against reductions of cumulative medium or long-term emissions. For this, a more
realistic model for total net present damage would be desirable: some limited discount-
ing of future damages, coupled with a non-linear mapping of cumulative emissions (resp.
concentrations) to damages would ideally be considered.
An encompassing analytical examination of all these issues seems infeasible. In order to
address them, it would thus be interesting to explore the case for the Green Paradox
about carbon taxes by means of numerical simulations. Even if many of the relevant
parameters for such an undertaking - especially the ones about the future climate regime
switch - may be subject to large uncertainties, it should allow at least some approximate
quantitative assessment of the qualitative claims brought forward by the Green Paradox
resp. by our analysis.
Broadening the perspective, we would like to conclude by stressing the implications of this
analysis for climate policy evaluation beyond the question of the Green Paradox. While
we have shown here how future independent climate-relevant developments may dramat-
ically in￿uence how a carbon tax quali￿es regarding the Green Paradox, the potential
future climate developments may be crucial for the net impact of any currently debated
climate measure. These potential future developments should therefore be taken into ac-
count when assessing current measures’ desirability and impacts in general, as is hardly
being done so far. Predictions about future climate-relevant developments, be they policy
measures or technological developments, are intrinsically linked to large uncertainty and
complicating re￿ections. Yet, the uncertainty of predictions is not truly reduced by sim-
ply ignoring its sources, rather the latter introduces some potentially large bias which, as
shown here, may crucially a￿ect the conclusions about possible policies.
209 Annex
(A) Single-crossing property for monopolist’s revenue
In order to rule out some theoretically possible multiple local maxima that would be dif-
￿cult to deal with analytically, we assume that the demand functions r(p), resp. their in-
verses p(r), exhibit the property that the marginal revenue of a monopolist’s resource sales
at a speci￿c period is falling in the current rate of extraction, i.e. that
@[p(r)+p0(r)r]
@r < 0,
over the full range of considerable extraction rates. This condition guarantees that Pt(rt)
is a strictly decreasing function not only in the competitive but also in the monopolistic
case. It notably implies that, should the value of Pt(rt) decrease, its argument rt increases,
and vice versa. Note that the property represents only an absolutely mild assumption:
typically considered demand functions, be they linear, quadratic, isoelastic, or exponen-
tial, all meet this assumption in any case. For the case of the world with a monopolist
and a tax in a region covering only a fraction of the worldwide demand, stringency of the
analytically derived conclusions will require an extension of this assumption: in this case
we will assume that for any considered regional tax level , the worldwide demand r(p;),
which is the sum of the demand r1(p+) in Region 1 that levies the tax and the demand
in the second, non-taxing region, r2(p), is such that
@[p(r;)+p0(r;)r]
@r < 0. This condition is
rather likely to hold as well in most cases. It can analytically be shown that it notably
holds for all linear, exponential and quadratic demand forms for which the corresponding
condition from the worldwide tax case holds - for the quadratic at least for limited tax
levels. Exceptions are, however, possible for a limited subset of situations with isoelastic
demand in the case of the regional tax.
(B) Proof of Proposition 1
Consider two situations in the same model but with notably di￿ering ￿nal multipliers,
T. The di￿erence between the two models’ variables be called t, At, rt and ct,
respectively. The claim can then be stated as
T > 0 ) AT < 0; (A.1)
with the considered time span being t = [0;T]. We will show by contradiction that the
claim in Eq. (A.1) holds unambiguously.
Assume thus the contrary,
T > 0 ^ AT > 0; (A.2)
which we will proove to be inconsistent.
21All considered variables, At, t, rt and ct, exhibit continuous time paths.
This implies that limt!T t = T and limt!T At = AT, i.e. limt!T t = T and
limt!T At = AT. Assuming Eq. (A.2) to hold, we thus know that the RHS in Eq.
(3) (with  = 0) will be larger for t ! T in the case of the increased ￿nal multiplier, i.e.
RHS > 0. Therefore Property 5 implies that the chosen extraction rates become lower
in the region where t is close to T:
limt!T rt < 0
Argument 1: If t of both situations coincide, then knowing that either of the remaining
variables rt or At coincide as well would imply that the other of the two latter variables
must coincide as well (from Eq. (3)), and that thus the whole model paths as well, because
the similarity at t of all variables implies a similar evolution of all variables. Demand-
and extraction cost-curves are the same in both situations. Thus, it is thus easy to verify
the following rule:
At = 0 ^  _ At 6= 0 ) signrt = sign _ At ^ signt =  sign _ At
Argument 2: t > 0 8
t[0;T]
would imply lower rather than higher cumulative emissions,
i.e. violate Eq. (A.2). limt!0 t > 0 would imply limt!0 rt < 0. This would imply
decreasing ct for low t, which would tend to alleviate the impact of the positive t
on rt. However, the negative value of ct could never fully compensate for the strictly
positive value of t in a way that could allow non-negative At-values in this subcase:
as soon as At would approach zero, it would again be the positive t value that
would dominate, reducing current rt and therefore prevent At to achieve zero or even
a positive value at any t > 0. This argument extends to any sub-period [s;  s], and
analogously to the case of an inverted sign of t. Thus we state:
As = 0 ^ t > 0 8
st s
) A s < 0 8
s6= s
(A.3)
As = 0 ^ t < 0 8
st s
) A s > 0 8
s6= s
(A.4)
Argument 3: Consider the case of Argument 2, adapted in the way that the multiplier
di￿erence converges to zero as time approaches s, i.e. limt!s t = 0 and s = 0. The
implied strict inequalities for As do not become weak in that case: if we had As = 0
simultaneously with s = 0, there would be no possibility how the extraction rates,
multipliers or cumulative extractions could have di￿ered in the pre- t s periods. As they
22did di￿er, however, the results from Argument 2 extend to
As = 0 ^ t > 0 8
st< s
^ s = 0 ) A s < 0 8
s6= s
As = 0 ^ t < 0 8
st< s
^ s = 0 ) A s > 0 8
s6= s
:
Argument 4: Consider the case of Argument 3, adapted in the way that the multiplier
di￿erence becomes zero already at some time s before s, and remains so up to time s, i.e.
t = 0 8
sts
. During the time where the two t-values coincide, the di￿erence between
the cumulative emissions cannot become zero at any time before s: Argument 3, if applied
to the interval [s;s], implies that As 6= 0. Moreover, whenever At = 0 for a speci￿c
s < t   s, i.e. for a time when t = 0, extractions and therewith the corresponding cost
curve evolved along the exact same path in both models within the whole time interval
[s;t]. (See also Argument 1 for a similar argument.) This would, however, require that
As = 0, which is impossible because As 6= 0. Thus, the results from Argument 2 and
3 extend to
As = 0 ^ t > 0 8
st<s
^ t = 0 8
sts
) A s < 0 8
s<s< s (A.5)
As = 0 ^ t < 0 8
st<s
^ t = 0 8
sts
) A s > 0 8
s<s< s; (A.6)
where the signs of the inequalities for As on the RHS do not switch, as in order to do
so At would have to cross the value 0, which, as just shown, is impossible.
Argument 5: Closely related to what is shown in Argument 1, if A0 = 0 then 0 6= 0;
otherwise we would be in the case where from time 0 onwards the two FOCs would
necessarily imply that the future evolution is the same in both cases, which notably
would not allow for the existence of any di￿erence in the ￿nal T-values. Thus we get
T 6= 0 ) 0 6= 0: (A.7)
Eq. (A.2), together with Arguments 2 (Eq. (A.3)), 4 (Eq. (A.5)) and 5 (Eq. (A.7)), imply
that there must exist some time t for which the multiplier-di￿erence is strictly negative.
As limt!T t > 0, this implies that there is a time t in the inner of the interval for
which t = 0. Moreover, if ￿nal cumulative emissions should grow larger as the ￿nal
multiplier increases, there would necessarily have a time interval [t;t]; 0  t <  t < T, to
exist for which At = 0, t < 0 8
tt< t
, t = 0 and At > 0 8
t(t; t]
. Together with Eq.
(5), these relations imply
t =
  t
t=t e(t t)_ ctdt < 0
At =
 t
t=t _ ctdt > 0 8
t(t; t]

    
;
23but this is ruled out by Lemma 2 (Part C of the Annex). Therefore, an increase of the
￿nal multiplier T is necessarily associated with a decrease in cumulative emissions up to
time T, AT. 
(C) Lemma 2
Lemma 2. For any two continuous and di￿erentiable functions G(t) and F(t) and their
￿nite derivatives g(t) and f(t), and any T > 0 and  > 0,
G(0) = F(0)







0 e-t [g(t)   f(t)]dt > 0 :
Proof. De￿ne H(t)  G(t)   F(t) and h(t)  g(t)   f(t). We thus have H(0) = 0
and H(t) > 0 8
t(0;T)
. Use further  
 T
0 e th(t)dt. Then, de￿ne hm as the path that




0 hm(s)ds > 0 8
t(0;T)
(A.8)
By the following reasoning hm cannot contain any periods with negative values:
￿ If hm(t) were to contain any negative values without that they were preceded (in
terms of lower values of t) by some positive values, the condition in Eq. (A.8) would
be violated: the integral over consequentially negative values with at least some of
them being strictly negative is necessarily negative.
￿ If hm(t) were to contain some strictly negative values that are preceded only by
positive values, simultaneously reducing some of the preceding positive values and
increasing some of the mentioned negative values, will on one hand leave una￿ected
the condition (A.8) and on the other hand reduce the value of , as the reduction of
the earlier occurring positive values is discounted less than the increase of the later
occurring negative values, leaving a net reduction in  and therefore contradicting
that the initial hm minimized .
As the path hm(t) can thus not contain any negative values, and in order for H(t) to take
on strictly positive values on the integral (0;T), it is clear that  must be positive as it is
an integral of weighted positive values with some of them being strictly positive, as well
as with strictly positive weights e t. Thus
 T
0 e t [g(t)   f(t)]dt > 0. 
24(D) Proof of Proposition 2
Assume an exogenously given, ￿x T.








(It will be intuitive that our analysis holds for the competitive case as well.) Inserting
Eq. (A.9) in Eq. (3) yields
pt(rt) + rtp
0







In the following we are going to proove by contradiction that the tax necessarily reduces
cumulative extractions up to T.
Suppose thus hypothetically that the contrary would be the case, i.e. that
AT;tax > AT;no; (A.11)
where we introduced the indexes tax and no to designate the variable, here AT, in the






csds = 0 and, from Eq. (A.11), limt!T cT;tax > limt!T cT;no.
Therefore, the RHS of Eq. (A.10) is strictly larger in the tax case (note that limt!T t =






Because all our variables evolve smoothly over time Eqs. (A.11) and (A.12) imply that
there exists a t that meets the de￿nition that the two variants’ extraction rates equate
each other for the last time in the pre-T period, i.e. such that
rt;tax = rt;no; (A.13)
and
rt;tax < rt;no 8t<tT: (A.14)
Relation Eq. (A.14) implies that the di￿erence At;tax   At;no is strictly decreasing during
25the time between t and T, which, considering Eq. (A.11) can only hold if
ct;tax > ct;no 8ttT: (A.15)



















ct;tax)dt  ct;tax   ct;no: (A.17)
As according to Eq. (A.15) the RHS of Eq. (A.17) is strictly positive, it is easy to see
that Lemma 2 (Part C of the Annex) implies that Eqs. (A.15) and (A.17) cannot be
reconciled, which concludes our proof by contradiction. 
(E) Proof of Lemma 1
First, note that from Property 5 (see Section 2) we know that, for a ￿xed tax, an increase
in the value of the RHS of the ￿rst order condition yields a decrease of the momentary
extraction rate.
Suppose that the value of the LHS expression in the FOC decreases when rt is ￿xed and
the tax t is increased from zero to a positive value. Consider further a no-tax case, where
the RHS has an initial value, called RHS0, yielding an initial extraction rate rt;0 at which
the RHS and the LHS of the FOC are equalized. As we suppose, adding a tax t decreases
the value on the LHS of the FOC when rt;0 is hypothetically held constant in a ￿rst step.
We thus would need to have a lower hypothetical RHS-value, RHS 1 in order for the FOC to
be equalized in the new situation with the tax. Now, the RHS-value is however given and
will not really be reduced to RHS1 but remain at RHS0. In order to see what this implies
for the instantaneous extraction rate, we then consider in a second step a hypothetical re-
increase of the RHS-value from RHS 1 to RHS0. Along with this hypothetical re-increase of
the RHS, we, however, will have to decrease the instantaneous extraction rate in order for
both sides of the FOC to still be equalized. This shows that if adding an instantaneous
tax t decreases the LHS-value of the FOC, then the extraction rate at that time will have
to decrease, given that the value on the RHS remains unchanged. We are now proceeding
to show that the tax t will indeed decrease the LHS-value at time t, which therefore
implies that it will decrease the extraction rate rt. This will conclude our proof. Note
that showing this property is not as obvious as it may seem at ￿rst sight, as adding a tax
in region 1 and leaving worldwide demand unchanged, does not simply mean to decrease
a demand, but to eventually decrease demand in Region 1 and simultaneously increase
26the demand in Region 2.
While pR(rt;t) unambiguously decreases with an increasing tax for a given rt, this cannot
be claimed to necessarily be the case for the second term of the LHS of the corresponding
FOC,
@pR(rt;t)
@r , without any further assumptions about the demand function. Here, we
show that the reduction of pR induced by a tax, i.e. - [pR(rt;t)   pR(rt;0)], unambiguously









for not too large tax levels and demand curves with ￿nite derivatives, wherewith the
direct e￿ect of the tax at time t unambiguously reduces the extraction rate in the current
period, rt.
Be r(p), the worldwide demand curve for the resource, a continuous, strictly decreasing
function with a third derivative that is ￿nite for any p > 0. The worldwide demand is
split into the regional demands r1 and r2, such that for a worldwide equal price, demand
in Region 2 corresponds to x times the demand in Region 1:
r1 + r2 = r
r2(p) = x  r1(p) (A.18)




2 (p) = x  r
(i)
1 (p); (A.19)
where the indice ()(i) denotes the ith derivative.
When Region 1 introduces a tax, the consumer price for the resource in that region, p1,
exceeds the consumer price in the tax free Region 2, p2, as well as the sales price for the
resource owners, pR, by the tax rate :
p1 = p2 +  = pR + 
The aggregate demand for a given sales price and a speci￿c tax rate is
r(pR;) = r1(p1) + r2(p2) = r1(pR + ) + r2(pR): (A.20)
As the demand curves in the two regions are continuous and strictly decreasing, Eq.
(A.20) directly implies that the worldwide demand is strictly decreasing as well in pR as
in . It is therefore clear that the inverse demand curve, here the sales price which for a
given tax yields a speci￿c aggregate demand, pR(r;), is strictly decreasing in r.
In the following, we will use the syntax var in order to express the discrete change of
27the value of the variable var resulting from the introduction of the tax:
var  vartax   varno tax
Consider the hypothetical case where a consumer tax is introduced in Region 1 and the
sales price demanded by the resource owners is adapted accordingly in a way that overall
the introduction of the tax does imply an unchanged global consumption. In this case,
demand in Region 1 would have to decline by exactly the same amount as the demand
in Region 2 would increase, and the corresponding changes in the regions’ sales, denoted
r, would have to exactly have the size that implies that the price di￿erence between the
two regions amounts to the level of the tax,
p1 + p2 = : (A.21)
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Figure A.1: Hypothetical situation of regional tax which is neutral for global emissions
In a ￿rst approximation we have:
r  p1  r
0
1(p0) (A.22)
r  p2  r
0
2(p0) (A.23)










Eq. (A.25) expresses that, in order to keep aggregate demand constant, the sales price
for the resource owner must decease by a value that is approximately proportional to the
tax rate.
From Eqs. (A.24) and (A.21) follows
p1  x  p2: (A.26)
In order to be able to make a statement about the corresponding change of the global
demand,
@pR(r;)



























 x  r
0









where the minus sign for the second term on the right hand side in Eq. (A.28) is due to
the fact that p2 is de￿ned in absolute terms, and where Eq. (A.29) follows from Eq.
































By using Eqs. (A.27) and (A.29), as well as Eq. (A.19), we can thus approximate this
response of the ￿rst derivative of the selling-price,
@pR





















For relatively small (p1)











which is proportional to the square of the tax induced price change.
The response of the seller price which leaves the global demand unchanged to the intro-




Using Eqs. (A.24) and (A.26) we therefore have the following ratio between the direct
e￿ect of the tax on the seller price which leaves global demand unchanged and the corre-












whose sign depends on the not speci￿ed sign of r000(p0).
As the ratio in Eq. (A.30) is proportional to the tax rate, and the factor by which this
tax rate is multiplied cannot be in￿nite due to the boundedness of our derivatives of





for taxes that are not too large, which proves our claim. 
(F) Proof of Proposition 5
Having a constant periodic probability ( ) that a backstop technology may arise, we know
from Dasgupta and Heal (1974) that the resource owners’ maximization problem di￿ers
from the deterministic case without backstop solely by a corresponding increase of the
discount factor. The ￿rst order conditions can thus be written as
Pt(rt) = c(At) + et + t (A.31)
_ t = t( +  )   _ ct:








We are considering an exponentially increasing tax, t = 0et, where  may exceed , as
long as  < .
We use the same syntax as in the proof for Lemma 1: var  vartax   varno tax, where
var can be a single variable or a combined mathematical term.
Note that, as the no-tax case corresponds to simply setting t;no tax = 0 8
t0
and in the tax
case we have t;tax > 0 8
t0
, we know that t > 0 8
t0
.
In the next step we are going to show by contradiction that the described tax path cannot
lead to increased cumulative emissions for any point in time:
30Assume thus, hypothetically, that the contrary holds, i.e. At > 0 for some t.
We treat two possible subcases separately:
-Subcase 1: Suppose, 9t0 s.t.
At0 = 0 (A.33)
and At > 0 8
t0<t<1: (A.34)
This requires rt0  0, and therefore, due to Eq. (A.31) and Property 5, that [t0 +
t0]  0, wherewith we have
t0 < 0: (A.35)
However, from Eq. (A.32) (and the transversality condition), we know that t0 =
 1
t=t0 e(t0 t) 








It is, however, straightforward to see that Eqs. (A.33) through (A.36) are not reconcilable
with Lemma 2 (Part C of the Annex). Therewith it is shown by contradiction that subcase
1 is impossible. Subcase1.
-Subcase 2: Suppose 9t1; t2; t1 < t2, s.t.
At1 = 0 ^ rt1  0; (A.37)
At2 = 0 ^ rt2  0; (A.38)
and At  0 8
t1<t<t2
: (A.39)
Eqs. (A.37) and (A.38) imply
ct1 = 0 ^ ct2 = 0; (A.40)
and therewith also
[t1 + t1]  0; (A.41)
and [t2 + t2]  0:
Eq. (A.39) indicates that
ct > 0 8
t1<t<t2
: (A.42)







De￿ning t  te-(t t1), which yields t1 = t1 and t2 = t2e(t2 t1), we can write







[t2 + t2]  0 ) e
-(t2 t1)[t2 + t2]  0 ) [t2 + t1]  0: (A.43)
As t1 > 0 the last expression in Eq. (A.43) implies
[at2 + t1] > 0 8
0a<1
: (A.44)









(t1 t)_ ctdt + t1]  0: (A.45)





(t1 t)_ ctdt]  0: (A.46)
However, Eqs. (A.46), (A.40) and (A.42) violate Lemma 2 (Part C of the Annex), a
contradiction. Subcase2.
If the tax were to increase cumulative emissions for some period, either subcase 1 or
subcase 2 would have to hold: we have A0 = 0 in any case, and for any t where At > 0
there must exist a latest preceding period, t, t < t, for which the tax does not impact the
cumulative emissions, At = 0 (t may be 0). Then, there exist two possibilities: either
the tax will increase cumulative emissions for all periods after time t - this is subcase 1 -,
or there exists some future period for which the cumulative emissions are not a￿ected by
the tax - this is subcase 2. Therefore, the shown inconsistency of both subcases prooves
that the considered taxes cannot increase the cumulative emissions, At, for any period t.
In addition, it is impossible that the tax does not change any periods’ emissions: if this
were the case, then t would be unchanged as well, but in this case the tax t would a￿ect
the extraction rate rt in Eq. (A.31). Thus, the considered tax necessarily reduces the
32emissions, at least in some periods.
We conclude that the considered tax (i) does not increase any period’s cumulative emis-
sions, (ii) reduces cumulative emissions at least for some periods, and (iii) thus unam-
biguously reduces the expectancy of the cumulative emissions, QED. 
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